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**SYNTHESIS OF DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE  
CROSS SECTORAL CASE STUDIES**

**October 2000**

Produced by:  
Robert Groelsema–AFR/SD/DG  
In collaboration with  
Don Muncy–AFR/SD/DG and  
Dr. Dana Ott–AFR/SD/DG

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## Acronyms Used

|           |   |
|-----------|---|
| ABIC      | Africa Bureau Information Center  |
| AFR/SD/DG | Africa Bureau/Sustainable Development/Democracy and Governance Division |
| CAMPFIRE  | Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources            |
| CBNRM     | Community Based Natural Resource Management                             |
| CDIE      | Center for Development Information and Evaluation                       |
| CLUSA     | Cooperative League of the USA   |
| COTR      | Contract Officer Technical Representative                               |
| CRD       | Communauté Rurale de Développement                                      |
| CSP       | Country Strategic Plan  |
| DG        | Democracy and Governance  |
| DHRF      | Democracy and Human Rights Fund   |
| FY        | Fiscal Year   |
| G/DG      | Global Bureau/Center for Democracy and Governance                       |
| IMF       | International Monetary Fund   |
| MPP       | Mission Performance Plan  |
| NGO       | Nongovernmental Organization  |
| NPA       | Nonproject Assistance   |
| NRM       | Natural Resources Management  |
| PHN       | Population Health and Nutrition   |
| PSC       | Personal Services Contractor  |
| PVO       | Private Voluntary Organization  |
| RDC       | Rural District Councils   |
| RGE       | Rural Group Enterprise  |
| R4        | Results Review & Resource Request                                       |
| SO        | Strategic Objective   |
| SOT       | Strategic Objective Team  |
| SpO       | Special Objective   |
| TDY       | Temporary Duty  |
| ZANU-PF   | Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front                         |

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## I. Programming for DG Cross-Sectoral Synergy

*The key thing that makes national law firms work is synergy;  
with the right combination, one and one can make three. —Steven Kumble*

It is said that two draft horses harnessed together pull seven times as much weight as one. This clearly illustrates the value of teamwork, of synergy. In the face of shrinking budgets, the injunction to do more with less has elevated this kind of synergy to a greater importance in the Agency. Indeed, the term's popular association with cross-sectoral programming has made it part of our bureaucratic lexicon, even though as Richard Blue's (1999) insightful review showed, USAID/Washington managers think the Agency has no written policy that requires, or encourages, cross-sectoral program linkages with democracy and governance (DG).<sup>1</sup>

For purposes of this report, synergy is defined as the (additional) development benefits derived from the combined actions of two or more strategic objective (SO) teams or Agency partners that would not have occurred through independent action. DG cross-sectoral programming constitutes deliberate, purposeful action to bring about sustainable development impact by incorporating DG principles, program components, and approaches into other sectors. Democracy refers to inclusiveness and wider participation in government and public affairs of marginalized and under-represented groups. It is about voice, empowerment, equal rights, representation, power-sharing, and ownership. Governance covers the process by which the ensemble of public rules, policies, laws, codes, regulations, and guidelines are made and enforced. It encompasses principles of transparency, fairness, accountability, and responsiveness.

### Purpose of the Report and Background

This report discusses DG cross-sectoral programming from five USAID Missions in Africa. It identifies actions Missions take to promote DG links, the policy and implementation constraints and challenges Missions and their partners face, the field impacts of their efforts, and future directions. It is hoped that this information will add clarity to DG-sectoral issues, and help practitioners apply DG approaches more effectively across sectors toward achieving sustainable development impact.

Africa Bureau interest in this topic evolved from the DG sector country assessments in 1993-94. Among other things, the assessments revealed a development relationship between governance and other sectors. One analyst concluded that USAID's sectoral programs have "the insight, track record, connections, and commitment necessary to launch and sustain governance reforms. Consequently, sectoral programming and DG reform need to be seen as inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing and *not* as disconnected rivals." (Walker, 1995)

To this end, the Democracy and Governance Team of the Africa Bureau's Office of Sustainable Development (AFR/SD/DG) adopted a strategic objective in 1997, "Strengthened Cross-Sectoral Synergies between Democracy and Governance and Africa Bureau Programs in Key Areas." The strategy calls for state-of-the-art knowledge on participation and local governance. Hence, the selection of Mali, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Guinea, and Madagascar as cases studies.<sup>2</sup> In a subsequent phase, the strategy requires the development of monitoring and evaluation tools to help Missions measure and report DG cross-sectoral impact.

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
<sup>1</sup> Richard Blue is a political scientist and former USAID employee. He authored "Democracy and Governance and Cross-Sectoral Linkages: An Interim Report on AID/W Perspectives and Issues" (January 1999). He also was a team member and co-author of CDIE's Madagascar and Philippines studies.

<sup>2</sup> USAID's Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE) co-sponsored the Guinea and Madagascar studies. These and the studies for Mali and Zambia are available as stand-alone documents on CDIE's document database, [www.dec.org](http://www.dec.org).

## Benefits of DG Cross-Sectoral Programming

The reciprocity between DG and other sectors has become the subject of considerable interest (see Brinkerhoff, 1998 and Diamond, 1999). Brinkerhoff observes that DG deepens and strengthens sector reforms by improving enabling environments, and by increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of sectoral reforms. DG is about finding ways to give voice to the under-represented and to support transparent rule-making. It's about finding means to link civil society, government, and business together, and about developing mechanisms for accountability.

Similarly, sectoral reforms offer societies laboratories for developing democratic culture. DG issues must be relevant to people's everyday lives. For example, achieving increased access to justice/decision-making can be an affirmation of benefits that derive from participation in a democratic process and hopefully lead to a more structured engagement of citizens with their government. Promoting DG principles such as participation and advocacy through sectoral lenses serves the objectives of empowering people to participate more fully in the management of local services, improve their quality of life, and give them opportunities to interact with their government and hold it accountable.



The diagram above illustrates DG–economic growth/private sector (EG) synergy.<sup>3</sup> The horizontal arrow (center) represents private sector and DG impact derived from civil society strengthening and cross-sectoral linkages (DG to EG and DG to DG). The vertical arrow (center) shows how justice and human rights programs improve equity in access/inclusion and how government institution strengthening contributes to political stability (DG to DG). The outer arrow (left) shows how increased political stability enhances productive investment (DG to EG), how that encourages economic growth (EG to EG), and how these both lead to equity in access/inclusion (EG to DG).

<sup>3</sup> The diagram is courtesy of the Latin America and Caribbean Bureau's Office of Regional and Sustainable Development (LAC/RSD).

## Key Findings from the Five Case Studies

- *It takes a change agent.* In all five cases, Mission management was given credit for having encouraged team leaders, staff, and partners to think and act collaboratively.
- *Partnership is critical to cross-sectoral success.* In Mali, the “Big Four” partners (CLUSA, Save the Children, CARE, and World Education) implemented a cooperative agreement with the Mission across three SOs. In Guinea, CLUSA combined agriculture-income generation activities with civil society strengthening and local government capacity-building. In Madagascar, PACT organized its team cross-sectorally, reflecting decisions taken by PACT/Washington to reduce stovepiping at headquarters.
- *Decentralization/civil society encourage DG links.* Missions placed the greatest emphasis on DG—sector linkage at decentralized levels. Missions and partners supported community-based natural resources management (CBNRM); parent, student, and school associations; health management committees; and farmer associations.
- *Synergy can be unintended or crafted.* Richard Blue observed that “synergy happens, but more fortuitously than for any other reason.” Some of the Missions were more purposeful in their approach to synergy than others, and some adopted more structured approaches to synergy than others. There seemed to be a trend, however, away from happenstance toward deliberate intent.
- *Evidence of impact is emergent.* DG—cross-sectoral programming is making a difference, but given its youth, most of the impact is still ahead. At the time of the studies, CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe had the longest activity with USAID involvement at 10 years. Most activities had implementation histories with USAID involvement of three years or less.

## Conclusions

- *Synergy needs to pay.* A persistent theme in the cases underscored the need for synergy benefits to outweigh the management costs. Madagascar’s rule of thumb was “returns on an additional unit of staff time employed in pursuing synergies should exceed returns of an additional unit of that staff time employed elsewhere.”
- *Better measurement and evaluation needed.* With few exceptions, Missions and partners urged development of M&E tools and indicators for reporting cross-sectoral impact.
- *Agency policy needs to support synergy.* It is apparent throughout the case studies that Agency policy has not caught up to DG—synergies practice. Congressional earmarks and unpredictable funding encourage stovepiping, while reporting and review by strategic objective for the R4 process reinforce sector-specific thinking. If the effort is to become mainstream, the Agency needs to encourage and reward synergy.

## II. Factors Facilitating Links between DG and Other Goal Areas

Five main factors facilitated DG cross-sectoral linking: 1) host country context; 2) Mission leadership; 3) continuity in belief systems, programming, and staff; 4) organizational approach; and 5) funding requirements. In most instances, the host country context impinged on Missions’ decisions to link DG with other sectors. For example, central level commitment to decentralization in Mali established a favorable environment to link DG with health, education, agriculture, and economic growth at grassroots levels. Conversely, in Zambia, setbacks in democratization and structural adjustment spurred Mission management to innovate. The second key factor was Mission leadership. In Madagascar and Guinea, a champion or a believer in DG synergies emerged to give SO teams the incentive to innovate and take

risks. Third, DG synergy became a strategic priority where substantial continuity in programming philosophy occurred. Collaboration takes time, and good teamwork requires a learning curve that involves persuasion, planning, cooperation, meetings, and the transformation of personal perspectives into shared values. Fourth, Missions had to organize themselves differently to effect the change they sought. Fifth, the pressure to obligate earmarked monies sometimes led Missions to reexamine their programming, thereby producing innovation.

### Country Context

*Zimbabwe.* When natural resource management was devolved from the national to local levels, it provided opportunities for integrating DG into environmental programs. As individual landowners and rural district councils were given the right to manage wildlife, the thrust to ensure sustainable management of natural resources gained more emphasis and resulted in more DG–environmental integration.

*Mali.* In Mali, a favorable host-country context facilitated integrating DG with SOs in youth and economic growth, and a special objective in information/communication. In March 1991, the overthrow of Mali's 23-year-old one-party state permitted the blossoming of civil society. More than 1,000 NGOs and 5,000 new associations registered with the government. These associations obtained much latitude in their choice of activities, and some of them became advocates for change. In May and June 1999, Malians chose leaders for 682 new local governments. These new governments needed management, law, and public administration skills.

The Mali Mission took advantage of the political opening and its designation as one of 10 country experimental labs to integrate programs. It began by creating 11 working groups to develop a Country Strategic Plan (1996-2002). One of the groups focused exclusively on synergy. This process purposively sought to create interrelated SOs and interdependent SO teams based upon overlapping activities, permitting them to co-plan and work together.

By the mid-1990s, the Mali Mission was implementing PVO activities in community forest management, parent and teacher association capacity building, community schools, rural community development, community health centers, small enterprise development, agricultural and village cooperatives, urban neighborhood associations, and local women's groups. The Cooperative League of the United States (CLUSA) reported that community access to agricultural credit from private banks improved. Village associations persuaded private national banks to accept applications for loans in the local language. They also persuaded government agencies to reduce the price and taxes of inputs, to increase regulation of insecticides, and to transfer and/or fine corrupt extension agents.

*Zambia.* Setbacks in democratization and structural adjustment in Zambia spurred Mission management to innovate to accomplish DG objectives through sector programs. In the early 1990s, the government cracked down on civil unrest by detaining opposition leaders without trial, and declaring a state of emergency in 1993. Prior to the 1996 elections, it barred the president's strongest rival from the presidential race. The U.S. reduced its support to Zambia, and the Mission subsequently refocused its DG strategy on decentralization, alternative dispute resolution, responsible advocacy by civil society, and research into ways DG could be made more relevant to basic needs. A high foreign-service national to direct hire ratio provided for continuity in personnel, which was instrumental for preserving institutional memory and furthering cross-sectoral objectives.

### Mission Leadership

*Guinea.* Guinea provides an interesting study in the way the Mission director responded to an inhospitable host-country environment. Two rounds of flawed elections (1993 and 1995) put Guinea on

the U.S. “watch list.” Subsequent termination of nonproject assistance to the Government of Guinea resulted in more than 50 percent reduction of the Mission’s operating year budget.

The Mission director responded by integrating local democratic governance into health, education, agricultural growth, and the environment in the 1997 Country Strategic Plan. He transformed the DG program from macro-economic policy and structural adjustment to the development of civil society, linking it with existing economic growth and environmental protection. The core of the integration combined economic growth and DG activities aimed at helping rural groups form sustainable, member-owned, and democratically operated cooperative businesses. The Mission added DG training for local governments when they expressed their desire for it, and when it became evident that more local government capacity was vital to the success of the DG program. In recognition of its multi-sector programs, USAID/Guinea was made a lead mission for USAID’s New Partnership Initiative. The Mission director confirmed that it was the adverse circumstances that encouraged innovation.

Overall, the Mission directors and Mission management were important promoters of DG cross-sectoral programming in at least three of the five cases (Mali, Madagascar, and Guinea). In Mali the front office encouraged synergy and provided positive feedback to staff. The many joint synergistic activities undertaken by staff were favorably noted in their annual evaluation forms and performance evaluation reviews.

### Program Continuity

*Madagascar.* Three directors in succession encouraged their staff to integrate DG with other sectors. One, in particular, championed it as “the right thing to do.” In the 1990s, the Mission absorbed large budget and personnel cuts as a result of the Government of Madagascar’s failure to sign and implement structural adjustment program agreements with the World Bank and the IMF. After being placed on the “watch list” in 1995, USAID Washington considered closure of the Mission in 1996/97, but opted for less extreme measures, downgrading the Mission to a Limited Program Mission. Consequently, Mission personnel declined by 40 percent, and the number of SOs was reduced from four to two and a special objective (SpO).

Indeed, survival of the program hinged on its cross-sectoral integration, a point that reviewers in Washington considered favorably. To balance needs with resources, Mission management integrated EG and DG into a single SpO, and applied them across environment, health, and infrastructure activities. It called to mind the adage, “Sweet are the uses of adversity, which, like the toad, ugly and venomous, bears yet a precious jewel in its head.”

For nearly eight years, “collaborative potential” was made a criterion for selection of junior staff and implementing partners. Committees, written policies, guidebooks, and rewards given by Mission leadership encouraged cooperation. Madagascar became an “open Mission,” meaning that Mission management emphasized the free flow of information, flexible management, leveraging of limited resources, and rewards and incentives for good performance. As a result, a process of institutionalization of DG integration was underway.

### Mission Organization

*Mali and Madagascar.* As noted above, the Madagascar Mission reorganized the work environment to promote DG links. Rather than dictating these changes, management consulted staff by holding retreats and workshops where, among other things, SO teams discussed collaboration across sectors. Mali facilitated collaboration through co-location of activities and development of joint cooperative agreements to serve multiple strategic objectives.

## Funding Obligations

*Zambia.* The Mission found an innovative way to obligate privatization funds by using them to pay for alternative dispute resolution. Specifically, the Mission used an ongoing project agreement to finance commercial arbitration through a partnership with the Law Association of Zambia.

## III. Constraints

Most Mission staff supported the principle of cross-sectoral integration, but contextual constraints (enabling environment and institutional learning), policy constraints (earmarks, review process, disincentives, and measurement issues), and operational constraints (measurement, reporting, contracting, time, and workload, etc.) discouraged them. The most frequently cited obstacles were operational, though they were not the most intractable.

### Contextual Constraints

*Enabling Environment.* Building institutional links among local governments, deconcentrated technical services, and capacity building organizations in decentralized contexts can be very synergistic depending on the host government's support for decentralization. As Blair observes, there is little incentive for highly centralized developing country governments to devolve power such as financial and tax authority to local government.<sup>4</sup>

In one example, the Guinea central government authorities asserted control over the NGO and cooperative sectors through registration, taxation, and ambiguous application of codes. The Guinea study concluded that unless the enabling environment for decentralized government and associational life improved, it would impede the success of local level developmental approaches. However, a restrictive enabling environment could provide an opportunity to promote DG in other sectors as a means to open political space, as was achieved by the USAID/CEDPA family planning project in Nigeria under Sani Abacha.

*Institutional Learning.* Most of the institutional learning in DG—cross-sectoral programming is still in the future, which requires Missions to take risks.

### Policy Constraints

*Earmarks.* Mali and Zambia put earmarking high on their constraints list. Congress directs the Agency to spend by sector and allocates the budget the same way. Thus, Missions stovepiped their activities to avoid misuse of funds. Earmarking was most apparent in health where restrictions on spending were spelled out in detail with the perhaps unintended side-effect of discouraging collaboration across SOs.

*Review Process.* The Agency has no clear policy or approved format for reporting on cross-sectoral development. Missions noted that R4 reporting requirements reinforced a mentality of sectoral thinking, partly because cross-sectoral activities do not fit neatly into sector molds and are awkward to review.

*Disincentives.* The Zambia Mission argued that because there was no constituency in Washington for synergy, there was no institutional incentive or motivation to work around competing demands on Mission time.

### Operational Constraints

*Measurement.* Missions emphasized that DG impact is less quantifiable than the number of children vaccinated or attending sixth grade. Causality may be difficult to trace. Intuition and anecdotal evidence

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<sup>4</sup> "Supporting Democratic Local Governance: Lessons from International Donor Experience—Initial Concepts and Some Preliminary Findings." 1996:4.

may not be sufficient to persuade decision-makers that the costs of collaboration outweigh the costs in time and management. Mali asked, “Can quantitative data be produced to convince the Mission and the Agency that the bang is worth the buck?”

In Madagascar, the Mission found that the indicator and results measurement systems in health and other technical sectors did not address democratic participation or governance. Consequently, DG results were given limited attention in the design, implementation, and measurement of technical tasks. The Mission therefore was unable to measure the impact of technical sectors on DG and vice-versa. In Guinea, the Mission did not count the contributions by rural group enterprises (RGEs) to community infrastructure in the health and education because they were not produced under their specific results package.

*Contracts.* Cooperative Agreements allowed the Missions more discretion in working with partners on DG links, whereas grants, once made, restricted this latitude.

*Time and Workload.* With few exceptions, interviewees saw DG linkage as extra work to squeeze into a too-full schedule. In Mali, PVOs already monitored a large number of indicators and were reluctant to add more. In Zambia, the staff felt overwhelmed by heavy reporting, and in Guinea the staff felt overextended by competing demands on their time.

*Training and Rotations.* Specialization and turnover were two key impediments to cross-sectoral programming. Most staff received sector-specific training, and the frequency of their rotation discouraged them from investing great effort outside their sectors.

*Organizational Complexity.* Not only does DG–cross-sectoral programming demand more communication outside one’s team, it also requires more organization. The Guinea Mission encountered this problem when it established a New Partnership Initiative team comprising all SO team leaders, their contractors, and grantee partners. The Mission also had designated one person from each SO team and a representative of the program office to participate in a mission-wide DG team that met once every two weeks. The meetings proved too cumbersome, and eventually were held infrequently only as needed.

*Potential Competition for Influence.* Mali’s unique joint cooperative agreements across SOs initially raised concerns that conflicts of interests might emerge. However, Mali’s SO teams developed good working relationships and were benefiting from strengthened teamwork.

## **IV. Field Impacts**

This section presents examples from the cases illustrating synergy between DG and other program areas. The examples show how DG approaches reinforce sector-specific results in other program areas, and how sector activities utilized democratic principles as part of their own goals and led to democratic outcomes.

### **DG Contribution to Sectoral Outcomes**

Brinkerhoff (1998) describes how DG enhances and deepens sectoral reforms by establishing the conditions under which reforms can flourish. These conditions—the enabling environment—include but are not limited to government that is closer to the people, more accessible to citizen participation, and responsive to citizen needs and desires. A positive enabling environment demonstrates the absence or the reduction of rent-seeking and reduced systemic corruption. A more participatory policy environment, and transparent decision-making and financial transactions result from a more positive enabling environment, with the presence of a vibrant media and many and varied civic advocacy groups as its hallmark.

Democratic governance increases the efficiency and effectiveness of sector reforms. Increased local control of resources creates conditions for a better utilization of them. In theory, a more participatory civil

society increases the oversight of government, and thereby contributes to better management and delivery of public services.

The Guinea example (see below) illustrates how citizen-advocates utilize the skills they acquire from participating in co-ops and apply them to the oversight of local taxation and service delivery. Members of co-ops (RGEs) who also were members of rural development councils (CRDs), transferred their management skills from the RGEs to their posts in local government. The net result was a rise in tax collection, an increased tax base, and more investment of these monies into local infrastructure.

The synergy resulting from the collaboration of state and market was also clear. It was impossible for rural group enterprises in Guinea to succeed in raising their incomes without working with the technical extension services of the public bureaucracy, or with local government. Indeed, local governments and RGEs co-produced infrastructure and services such as schools, health clinics, and mosques through their partnerships.

*Zimbabwe.* The Zimbabwe Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) owes its success to three enabling conditions: 1) legislation granting rural district councils appropriate authority over wildlife; 2) a high-revenue generating, sustainable wildlife resource; and 3) political will and innovative ideas in the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management. The Zimbabwe Trust field staff, in particular, seemed strongly committed to the notion that local people should be fully involved in environmental and economic decisions affecting them. As a result, people found sources of legal revenue, acquired management skills, and stabilized poaching. The DG principles under-girding this program increased its appeal, and helped it spread from the pilot areas to more than one-third of the country.

*Guinea.* A combined DG/EG and agriculture activity led by CLUSA helped produce economic growth, increased agricultural production and participatory grass-roots governance. Establishing RGEs and training members in democratic, participatory methods such as one member one vote, elections of leaders, and transparent budgeting and reporting led to advocacy and oversight of local government by rural communities in lower Guinea. On one level, RGE members succeeded in leveraging technical training to gain influence in local public affairs. Women joined RGEs, and some formed associations exclusively with women's membership. They were able to gain leadership experience and confidence in voicing their opinions in local politics and development. As a result of the collective effort of RGEs, banks conducted transactions in local languages, and the Ministry of Agriculture reduced prices and taxes of agricultural inputs, increased regulation of insecticides, and sanctioned corrupt extension agents.

The momentum from these accomplishments led to changes in government business. People began to demand the same budgeting transparency from their local government leaders and accountability in taxation they had become accustomed to in their RGEs. Local officials, who had little training, asked to be included in the training for RGEs, and asked RGEs to share their management expertise. As a result, RGEs figured prominently in helping CRDs identify and collect local taxes from markets, truck stops, timber harvests, and gravel pits. With their organizational strength and management capacity, the RGEs provided oversight in spending those monies. They insisted that their taxes be invested in schools, health clinics, and other infrastructure according to law. In a few instances, they removed corrupt officials from office.

*Madagascar.* In the northwest coastal town of Mahajanga, neighborhood organization, citizen advocacy, and mediation were instrumental in resolving an impasse between city government and residents over taxation issues. The American PVO, Pact, initiated a citizen-led effort called *Rary*, "weaving" in Malagasy, which brought representatives of neighborhood organizations and city government together to debate the city's tax plan and discuss residents' grievances. The city learned how to conduct public

hearings on the budget, and succeeded in increasing its tax recovery rates by more than 50 percent. By learning and applying mediation techniques, residents established a neighborhood-managed, cost-recovery potable water system. Mahajanga now has some 48 neighborhood groups, an umbrella association of these groups, called Hery Miray, and the city has a communications/liaison office to serve the public.

### Sectoral Influence on Democratic Governance

This section presents examples from the cases illustrating DG benefits derived from sectoral activities. The aim in situating DG within other sectors is to generate improvements across all aspects of daily life such as health care and education while developing a shared vision of community and national values. Promoting DG principles such as participation and advocacy at the local level through local health committees or farmers groups serves the dual objectives of empowering people to improve their quality of life, and giving them opportunities to interact with their government and hold it accountable. Sectors provide laboratories for building social capital and strengthening democratic culture.

*Mali.* The education policy reform process furthered ownership and empowerment of citizen groups in Mali, and improved the quality of education. In 1990, USAID's Basic Education Expansion Project (BEEP) helped transfer school management authority from the Ministry of Education in Bamako to PTA members upcountry. The Mission linked the DG SO to the education objective and supported involvement of civil society groups. Consequently, BEEP implementers, World Education, conducted civic education and advocacy, and Save the Children provided training and technical assistance in democratic self-governance, management, and civic action skills. As a result, PTA members, who formerly had relied on the Ministry of Education for resources and leadership, assumed ownership of their schools. For example, they collected their legal portion of the local and regional development tax and spent it on their schools.

*Madagascar.* The Mission launched the Commercial Agricultural Promotion program (CAP) to help villages rehabilitate and maintain local roads because the high costs of bringing produce to market discouraged production. Villagers found that the most effective and sustainable road maintenance arrangement was to form private associations and give them responsibility for the maintenance. To pay for recurring costs, the committees set up tollgates, charged user fees, and managed the proceeds.

As a result, improvements in infrastructure that were designed to raise agricultural production and increase family farm incomes created opportunities for participation, accountability, transparency, and self-governance. The associations held open meetings, elected officers, opened their books to members, and broadened community participation via toll-road management issues. Ultimately, CAP helped establish structures and mechanisms for DG, increased experience with governance mechanisms and processes, and built social capital among the rural communities surrounding the provincial capitals of Mahajanga and Fianarantsoa.

## V. How SO Teams Achieved Cross-Sectoral Synergies

There is no single method or path to synergy, but there are points in the policy pipeline where specific actions help achieve the desired goal. Below are a number of successful practices gleaned from the field, the majority of them from Mali.

### Planning and Implementation Practices

*Building from the Ground Up.* Mali built sector integration into Mission programming during its country strategic plan (CSP) discussions. Subsequently, Mission staff negotiated results frameworks between SOs and their partner PVOs. Each PVO submitted a combined progress report to the Mission through the agreement officer's technical representative. The reports were discussed during cooperative agreement

meetings and individual team meetings with the partners. The Madagascar Mission let potential partners know that proposals with significant cross-sectoral content would receive greater consideration in the review process.

*Design a Cross-Sectoral DG Team.* When designing its DG SO, the Mali Mission opened DG staff positions for bidding within the Mission. The selected DG team leader brought with her a master's degree in business, and management experience from the comptroller's office. Her familiarity with other sectors and the multi-disciplinary skills on the team facilitated teamwork with sector colleagues.

*Include Collaboration in Work Objectives.* Collaboration must be consensual, but the Mali Mission assigns synergies in the work objectives of certain SO team members.

*Promote Mission Teamwork.* In Zambia, the economic growth (EG) officer, the comptroller, and the program officer participated on the DG team. The DG advisor served as a member of the EG team.

*Share Contractual Responsibility.* The Mali mission utilized joint cooperative agreements to promote an integrated strategy. The Youth, Economic Growth, and DG teams worked with the same set of partners to achieve different sets of results under four joint cooperative agreements. Teams combined their funding across two or more SOs and designated results package managers for different intermediate result packages. The DG sector SO funded studies in the education and in economic growth sectors to develop a unified policy agenda for the Mission.

*Co-Locate Activities.* The Mali Mission situated as many activities as possible within a prescribed area. The strategy made more efficient use of resources and facilitated collaboration.

*Plan Joint Site Visits.* To benefit from co-location, the Mali Mission organized field visits with other SO teams. The visits enhanced cross-fertilization of ideas and helped identify joint activities. Mission staff in Mali recommended sending technical staff on field visits to learn about their colleagues' activities and to look for opportunities to promote their programs.

*Target Specific Activities.* Mali linked DG activities to specific problems in other SOs, and worked within existing activities to increase Mission impact. The DG SO used its comparative advantage to strengthen organizational capacity of civil society associations through training in democratic self-governance, management, civic education, civic action, and literacy. It also took the lead in operationalizing the newly mandated communes (local government units). DG team members developed expertise in a theme area such as cooperatives and provided technical assistance in their areas. In Zambia, the EG and DG SOs found they could support alternative dispute resolution by working together. The EG expert worked with the business community on privatization and commercial arbitration. DG team members provided technical assistance to the legal community including the judiciary branch.

*Participate in R4 Reviews.* In Guinea and in Mali, DG SO team members attended and contributed to the mini-R4 review of the other sectors and attended the reviews of unsolicited proposals from PVOs.

*Assess Synergy Opportunities.* The CDIE study team found that the Guinea Natural Resources Management project could further enhance its synergy by adding a specific DG component to the community appraisal tool. The existing tool included five or six elements that focussed on activities such as animal husbandry and goods and services. It was suggested that these efforts might be enriched and sustained by including DG principles such as representation and accountability, and by encouraging greater involvement of the local government councils in the management of local natural resources.

*Ask for Help.* Review of a Mission's portfolio may reveal new potential for developing DG synergies. One reviewer of this report noted that Missions do not need to do it all in-house—they can rely on a dedicated technical staff in Washington. In the case of the Mali BEEP and Zimbabwe CAMPFIRE, AFR/SD education and natural resource experts helped build in the DG components (see Annex 3 for sample scope of work document).

### Attitudinal Practices

*Be Enthusiastic.* It has been said that attitude determines altitude. The Mali DG team found that overcoming bureaucratic resistance to synergy required a passion for it. This generated excitement for it among other SO teams, and thereby increased the likelihood of achieving a higher level of results.

*Think Integratively.* As one member of the Madagascar team put it, the Mission tried to develop a holistic attitude toward thinking about development. SO teams analyzed the socioeconomic, cultural, and political factors contributing to the exploitation of protected zones, and they considered multiple solutions including economic development, agricultural intensification, and governmental and NGO capacity-building. In its health SO, the Mission integrated community, NGO, and multiple levels of government participation. The Mission also employed its holistic vision to link rule of law, taxation policy, and trade and investment activities within an EG–DG special objective.

## VI. Future Directions: HIV/AIDS and DG

This section considers application of DG principles to the burgeoning AIDS pandemic in Africa. AIDS is threatening political and civic leadership, the national militaries, the human and civil rights of women and children, and government capacity. Democratic governance can counter this threat in several ways (see below). It is Professor Alan Whiteside's belief that countries will be better equipped to respond to and control the disease if they develop their civil societies and improve their governance.<sup>5</sup> It is clear that HIV impacts every sector and that each sector has a role in prevention and mitigation of the disease.

DG activities can contribute to prevention and mitigation through a variety of means:


- Advocating for national political commitment to fighting the disease
- Involving civil society and mobilizing communities
- Reducing stigma by working with local and national government and NGO leaders
- Strengthening governance and financial management in the context of decentralization
- Improving human rights and legal frameworks for women, people living with HIV/AIDS, and orphans
- Promoting the media and information flows of factual and culturally sensitive information

Following the September 1999 consultative meeting on “AIDS as a Development Crisis in Africa,” participants from donor groups and PVOs formed a technical working group to share experiences and to promote inter-agency collaboration. One of several initiatives underway is an effort to map existing and potential DG sector–HIV/AIDS links in selected African countries and to develop a DG–HIV/AIDS toolkit that may be used widely for policy design, prevention, care and support. The kit would help identify lessons so that best practices can be replicated and scaled up.

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<sup>5</sup> See for example, Barnett and Whiteside. “HIV/AIDS in Africa: Implications for ‘Development’ and Major Policy Implications.” 1999.

## Successes



The cross-cutting relationships among key USAID sectors involved in HIV are depicted by the diagram above.<sup>6</sup> The arrows indicate top down and bottom up sectoral approaches. From the top, ministries in each sector must re-examine their management capacity and strategy to reach the high risk and vulnerable groups such as youth and orphans (represented in the core circle). Toolkits are available for each sector to do precisely that. From the bottom, community involvement will inform management strengthening and revamping of strategies. Issues of participation and good governance surround and filter the intersection of sectoral activities.

Dr. Ishrat Husain, senior technical advisor on HIV/AIDS for Africa SD/HRD, emphasizes that transparency and accountability must be improved in health service delivery to ensure that resources are mobilized efficiently and effectively: “In HIV/AIDS, strengthening of management is extremely important as money is going to flow from private foundations as well as multilateral and bilateral agencies. If these resources do not reach where they are needed or are not well utilized, Africa will be in a worse situation than now...” Dr. Husain suggested the following actions:

- Sensitize Missions and NGOs working in DG, health, and education on the importance of management and governance issues;
- Carry out a quick review of the best practices in management in a given country that can serve as a prototype for management of HIV;
- Select an area in the country for demonstration purposes;
- Strengthen management capacity at the central level through civil service and administrative improvements and training;
- Examine past civil service reform experience to avoid costly mistakes;
- Study organizational structures of successful multisectoral programs such as population;
- Leverage other donors to join hands.

<sup>6</sup> This diagram appeared in the AFR/SD R4 FY2002 wrap-up, and is courtesy of the AFR/SD/HIV-AIDS Strategic Objective Team.

## The Angola Experience

With USAID support, Angola has created a multi-sectoral working group composed of members of parliament, lawyers, physicians, development specialists, ministry officials, and donors to survey citizens' opinions and attitudes on prospective HIV/AIDS legislation in Angola. Results of the survey informed the legislation. The working group then involved several ministries including justice, labor, finance, and planning to back ratification of the law. Subsequently, an association of people living with HIV/AIDS was established. The association lobbied the Ministry of Justice for quick legal registration, sent two HIV-positive individuals to Brazil on a study mission, and assumed responsibility for archiving literature on HIV/AIDS for public education.

## The Zambia Experience

In Northern Province, high death rates have widowed and orphaned many women and children, and made them vulnerable to property grabbing. A Democracy and Human Rights Fund grant to the judiciary was utilized to revise inheritance laws, and through a series of seminars, magistrates and judges in Northern Province have become more aware of new laws guaranteeing rights to women and children. In addition, the Mission has established a cross-sectoral "Widows and Orphans Task Force," which trains judges of the high court and government prosecutors on inheritance laws. By seeking to protect the rights of AIDS victims, the effort is strengthening rule of law and furthering the PHN agenda in Zambia.

## VII. Twelve Action Steps

How's your synergy output? Here are 12 ways (not in any particular order) to increase it.

1. *Find a change agent.* Mali, Guinea, Madagascar, and the Dominican Republic (from CDIE's study) revealed that a change agent/person with a vision was needed to catalyze cross-sectoral cooperation. In the country studies, this person was usually the program officer or Mission director.
2. *Profit from windows of opportunity.* PACT/Rary in Madagascar was ready to respond to the new set of demands created by donor conditionalities and decentralization. Rary showed citizens and city officials in Mahajanga and Fianarantsoa how to negotiate a win-win settlement (see Section IV, Field Impacts; Madagascar).
3. *Turn adversity into opportunity.* Downsizing forced two Missions in these studies to do more with less, illustrating the perversity principle: the more development you do with fewer resources, the less you get in the next budget cycle. Nonetheless, under adversity, these Missions became creative, entrepreneurial, and opportunistic.
4. *Include women.* Rural group enterprises in Guinea are benefiting from women's participation. By their votes and leadership, women are advocating better education and health in their communities. By involving women, RGEs are training tomorrow's leaders.
5. *Invent a better mousetrap.* Find better ways to capture technical results correlated with DG approaches. For example, how many more mothers brought babies in for inoculations because of a functional health management committee (HMC)? Did a participatory HMC make a difference in the condom prevalence rate?
6. *Plan for success.* Within the overall strategic framework of the Mission, use your upcoming retreat or meeting to discuss how linkages can be created and strengthened across SOs. Map out locations of existing and planned activities in all sectors then co-locate activities where cross-sectoral collaboration would add value. Send technical staff on field trips to learn about activities outside their sectors.

7. *Co-finance.* Look for opportunities between or among SOs to co-finance cross-cutting activities such as NGO and community-based organization capacity building.
8. *Encourage synergy partnerships.* Encourage colleagues and implementing partners to develop requests for proposals/activities that emphasize cross-sectoral cooperation.
9. *Build a constituency.* Write letters to your congressman/woman explaining how earmarking encourages stove-piping. Show USAID staff how to build synergy opportunities into scopes of work. Review existing scopes of work and work objectives for synergy.
10. *Reward behavior.* Mission management can and should reward successes in cross-sectoral linkages that clearly increase sustainable development impact.
11. *Take some risks.* Get your “Think Synergistically” bumper sticker and wear your “Synergy is Cool” button. Find one new synergistic activity to add to your bag of development tricks each fiscal year.
12. *Have fun.* Party with your cross-SO colleagues outside the office. No kidding—the field suggested it. Inter-disciplinary socializing is a great way to find out what other folks are doing and what you are missing.

## **Annex 1: Documents Related to Cross-Sectoral Programming**

“Africa Bureau Promotion of Cross-Sectoral Linkages: An Overview.” AFR/SD/DG. December 1999.

Barnett, Tony and Alan Whiteside. “HIV/AIDS in Africa: Implications for ‘Development’ and Major Policy Implications.” Paper presented at Fourth SCUSA Inter-University Colloquium UEA Norwich, 5-8 September 1999.

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Blue, Richard N. “Democracy and Governance and Cross-Sectoral Linkages: An Interim Report on AID/W Perspectives and Issues.” USAID/CDIE. January 1999.

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Brinkerhoff, Derick W. and Veit, Peter G., “Links between Democratic Governance and Environmental Policy in Africa: Guidance for NGOs and Donors.” Policy Brief #5, Natural Resources Policy Consultative Group for Africa. June 1999.

Charlick, Robert and Lippman, Hal. “Democracy and Governance and Cross-Sectoral Linkages: Case Study of USAID/Guinea.” PPC/CDIE, AFR/SD/DG, MSI. April 1999.

“Constituencies for Reform: Strategic Approaches for Donor-supported Civic Advocacy Programs.” USAID, Program and Operations Assessment Report No. 12. CDIE. February 1996.

Diamond, Nancy K. “Exploring Linkages between Governance, Democracy-Building and Environment.” Consultant report for the Biodiversity Support Program, Washington, D.C. December 1999.

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Hart, Liz. “Democracy and Governance and Cross-Sectoral Linkages: An Interim Report on AID/W Perspectives and Issues.” USAID/G/DG. October 1999.

Isman-Fn’Piere, Pat. “Activities Across Sectors Which Can Contribute to Democracy Building,” USAID/G/DG. July 1999.

Lippman, Hal and Blue, Richard. “Democracy and Governance Cross-Sectoral Linkages: Madagascar Case Study.” PPC/CDIE, AFR/SD/DG, MSI. October 1999.

Miller, David and El Sawi, Gwen. "Democracy and Governance Cross-Sectoral Linkages: Mali Case Study." AFR/SD/DG. November 1999.

Ott, Dana; O'Toole Salinas, Anne; and Miller, David. "Democracy and Governance Cross-Sectoral Linkages: Zambia Case Study." AFR/SD/DG. November 1999.

"Scope of Work for Study of Democracy and Governance and Cross-Sectoral Linkages." PPC/CDIE, May 1998.

"Spreading Power to the Periphery: An Assessment of Democratic Local Governance." USAID Program and Operations Assessment Report No. 21. CDIE. September 1998.

Walker, Tjip S. "Democratic Governance and Sectoral Work: Toward Programmatic Integration." Associates in Rural Development, Inc., Management Systems International, Inc., USAID/AFR/SD. February 1995.

## Annex 2: Country Overviews

This annex is intended to provide the reader with some contextual information about host country strategic importance to the U.S. and USAID's Mission portfolio in that country.

### Guinea

Guinea is considered pivotal to the peace and stability of West African coastal states. According to the Mission's R4, "USAID/Guinea's development program is an integral part of the U.S. Mission Performance Plan (MPP), which focuses on: a) reinforcing Guinea's ability to play a more effective role in regional conflict-resolution and peacekeeping; b) promoting good governance and establishing strong democratic institutions; and c) mitigating human suffering by providing humanitarian assistance to refugees and development assistance in areas of health and family planning, education, and environment."

Much of the potential program synergy in Guinea lies within the country's decentralization plan. Though promulgated more than a decade ago, decentralization has taken root slowly as efforts to train and build capacity for local management and democratic governance are just beginning and mainly donor-driven. The Guinea Mission has SOs in NRM, education, health, and DG.

*NRM.* The NRM SO reads "Increased use of sustainable natural resource management practices." Key areas for synergy include community-based natural resource management in the form of village management and inter-village co-management committees. Winrock, VITA and Land O'Lakes implement the new expanded NRM project. OICI implements the PL 480 Title II-funded profitable agriculture and village extension project. VITA implements the Guinea rural enterprise development project.

The NRM sector illustrates opportunities and constraints to DG synergies. The co-management of the Nyalama Classified Forest has led to an agreement to legally transfer responsibility for forest management from the Guinean Forest Service (DNEF) to local communities. This agreement was signed by the president of the inter-village forest committee, representing 30 villages, and then by the director of the DNEF. This process represents positive change towards developing the structures, mechanisms, and experience for citizen participation in forestry and other forms of resource management, but it has required much donor leadership and involvement, especially to obtain agreements from the central government on legal and enabling environment matters.

*Education.* The education SO reads "Quality primary education provided to a larger percentage of Guinean children, with emphasis on girls and rural children." A key synergy target is the parent-teacher association called *l'Association des Parents et Amis de l'Ecole*. World Education is helping local NGOs develop their capacity to assist APEAEs in taking charge of their schools, which may include recruiting and hiring teachers.

*Health.* The health SO reads "Increased use of essential family planning, maternal child health, and STI/HIV/AIDS-prevention services and practices." The main target of opportunity in this SO is the planned, but still mostly future, establishment of health management committees at the local level.

*DG.* The DG SO reads "Improved local and national governance through active citizen participation." The DG SO is mainly focused on governance at local levels in Maritime Guinea with economic growth, agriculture, and other sectoral dimensions. CLUSA's Wakili activity has distinguished itself for strengthening the governance of member-managed rural enterprise groups and linking them to elected rural development councils, and to deconcentrated technical services in agriculture, health, education, and the environment.

Hal Lippman (CDIE), Robert Charlick, Jesse Ribot (consultants), and Robert Groelsema (AFR/SD/DG) conducted the field work on the Guinea case study.

## **Madagascar**

Madagascar's strategic importance to the U.S. and the rest of the world is based on its unique flora and fauna. According to the Mission's R4 for 2001:

The island of Madagascar has been cited as the highest biodiversity priority in Africa and among the top three global "biodiversity hotspots" by international conservation organizations. This biological importance makes Madagascar especially significant to the US for three main reasons: 1) Madagascar is one of the premium places for increasing our knowledge of how evolution takes place; 2) Madagascar provides a storehouse of plants and animals not yet known to science that could lead to cures for major diseases; and 3) the forests of Madagascar provide an important carbon sink to combat the causes of global warming. However, Madagascar is the 13<sup>th</sup> poorest country in the world and its natural resources are under serious threat from poverty, population growth, deforestation, and soil erosion. Degradation of the global environment increasingly threatens the economic and political interests of the United States and the world at large.

*NRM.* The NRM SO reads "Biologically diverse ecosystems conserved in priority zones." The Mission's conservation efforts are multisectoral and include environmental policies and legislation. The opportunity for synergies are myriad, especially because the Mission has chosen to focus on the causes of environmental degradation such as poverty, low levels of education, and the lack of citizen empowerment and community organization.

*Health.* The health SO aims to help stabilize the world's population and protect human health through smaller, healthier families. It is focused on family planning, improving diet to prevent stunting from malnutrition, and prevention of HIV/AIDS.

*DG-EG Special Objective (SpO).* The Mission views its SpO as integral to achieving the Mission performance plan's economic development and democracy goals. Greater predictability and rule of law in the conduct of business via improved business codes and their enforcement is envisioned. The Mission also wants to see wide stakeholder input into traditional top-down policy. The SpO combines an emphasis on macro-level institutions and regimes such as taxation, commercial law, and court administration with a focus on strengthening civil society participation and communication flows in citizen-government relations.

Field work was conducted in March 1999 by Hal Lippman (CDIE), Richard Blue (consultant), and Robert Groelsema (AFR/SD/DG).

## **Mali**

Having passed through its political crucible in the revolution of 1991, Mali is decentralizing. It also has one of the most independent broadcast and print media in West Africa. Mali's civil society has blossomed over the past decade, and following the local elections in 1999, Mali has established nearly 700 local governments to which the central government has delegated considerable political and administrative powers and taxation authority. The Mission has designed three cross-cutting SO's and two SpOs. The SO's are seven-year activities initiated in 1995.

*Youth.* The youth SO reads “Changed social and economic behaviors among youth in targeted geographic areas.” It is designed to help Malians under 25 by targeting improvements in child survival, reproductive health, basic and environmental education, and job skills development.

*EG.* The sustainable economic growth SO reads “Increased value-added from specific economic sub-sectors to national income.” It aims to increase the value-added of four economic sub-sectors: livestock, cereals, financial services, and new opportunities. This activity seeks to improve the policy environment, improve technology and worker skills, and offer greater access to financing and market information. The private-sector emphasis of this program and USAID’s participatory approach are expected to create the demand needed to sustain these activities after USAID funding ends.

*Info/Com SpO.* This SpO reads “Improved access to and use of information.” It aims to improve access to and facilitate the use of information through Internet and community radio broadcasting. Activities focus on expanding the dissemination of existing information by: 1) enhancing the existing liberal enabling environment associated with the information and communication sector; 2) increasing the number of Malians who obtain and use current development information; and 3) enhancing communications. USAID supports the Malian government’s encouragement of the private sector involvement in the distribution of Internet services.

*SpO for the North.* This SpO reads “Promoting stability in northern Mali through broad-based development.” It is a four-year special objective, initiated in 1998, that supports the efforts of people of northern Mali to acquire the capacity and confidence to promote stability through broad-based and sustainable local development. This is enhanced by: 1) strengthening civil society’s ability as an effective partner with government in planning and decision-making; 2) increasing economic activity and income; and 3) increasing availability and access to basic social services.

*DG.* The democratic governance SO reads “Targeted community organizations are effective partners in democratic governance, including development decision-making and planning.” It focuses on two major areas: 1) helping target community organizations to engage in democratic governance and civic participation primarily at local levels; and 2) helping put in place an enabling environment that empowers community organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and federations. The DG SO supports the Malian government’s decentralization. It provides community organizations with training and technical assistance in democratic self-governance, effective management, civic education, civic action, and functional literacy.

Mali is unique for its organizational and budgetary support for a cross-cutting DG SO. The SO was designed to encourage greater synergy across mission programming and shares cooperative agreements with CLUSA, Save the Children, World Education, and CARE. The “big four” NGOs, as they are known, contribute to SO results in health, education, agriculture, and DG.

To ensure sustainability of community organizations, the DG SO strengthens the income-generating capacity of local NGOs, federations, and representative partner organizations. The DG SO identifies, analyzes, and addresses constraints in existing regulations affecting community organizations, NGOs, and federations. The DG team also conducts civic education campaigns on decentralization, and improves laws and policies affecting the sustainability of community organizations.

Field work for the Mali case study was conducted in October 1998 by David Miller (consultant), Gwen El Sawi (G/HCD), Pat Isman-Fn’Piere (G/DG), and Heather Brophy (AFR/SD/DG).

## **Zambia**

Zambia occupies a strategic location in south-central Africa, but it has been reluctant to implement political reforms. Its neighbors, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Angola, are fighting protracted civil wars, which have engulfed other states in the region. The number of Zambians employed in the mining industry makes it one of Africa's most urbanized countries, but the relocation requirements of this industry have encouraged the spread of HIV/AIDS. Food security and the sustainability of Zambia's fauna, flora, and tourist industry constitute key development priorities for the country.

The Zambia Mission has strategic objectives in health, education (ED), economic growth (EG), and DG. Activities in agriculture and the environment are grouped within EG. Along with health and ED, the scope of these activities have been or are being expanded to address institutional and political constraints independent of the Mission's democracy and governance strategic objective.

The DG SO supports four key cross-cutting initiatives. The first strengthens the capacity of the auditor general of Zambia (AG), the investigative arm of Parliament, to investigate and uncover the improper use of public funds. The goal is to support the Parliament's aim to be a more effective watchdog over the executive, especially in curbing corruption. U.S. foreign assistance health care dollars benefit from this effort because the AG audits the use of funds from USAID's PHN program. A recent example is the International Conference on AIDS and STDs in Africa. DG resources have been used for AG staff training in USG audit requirements as well as to cover costs of outsourcing audit work to private sector firms. The Mission's comptroller's office has helped formulate terms of reference, and the tendering and contracting of audit services. With the Mission's help, the AG's office conducted a sensitive audit of high-profile multi-donor support for the constitutional review commission from 1995-1996.

Second, the Mission's DG resources have been combined with resources from USAID's Leland Initiative to assess the information and communication needs of the Central Board of Health associated with decentralized public health monitoring, planning, and programming of government investments. The Mission wants to decentralize line-ministry operations to shift responsibility, authority, and resources to levels of government where services are delivered closest to citizen-customers. Given the critical role of health and education to HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation, the Mission believes it makes good sense to use DG resources to improve public administration and governance. The aim according to the Mission is "to put into practice the various concepts and principles that constitute the notion of democratic governance."

A third cross-cutting initiative targets the administration of justice. In cooperation with the economic growth and privatization strategic objective team, the DG staff is working on a commercial arbitration system to enforce commercial contracts without getting bogged down in overcrowded courts, and thereby pave the way to private sector-led growth. The activity utilizes USAID privatization funds with DG design, management, and monitoring, and draws on the expertise of the International Trade Center of United Nations Commission on Trade and Development/World Trade Organization, the Law Association of Zambia, and the Forum for International Commercial Arbitration, a private foundation. This collection of partnerships has produced two classes of accredited Zambian arbitrators, and a draft arbitration act modeled on the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. Further, it has provided the Zambian government an extensive public outreach and extension program involving the judiciary and the business community. The partners have established regional ties with neighboring arbitration and alternative dispute resolution organizations including several international institutions. Institutionalization of the effort is taking place as the partners are organizing a professional association of arbitrators and an administrative center to manage the process.

Fourth, the Mission utilized a Democracy and Human Rights Fund grant (co-managed by USAID and the Department of State) to the judiciary to sponsor a series of seminars to raise awareness among magistrates and judges about the rights of women and children, particularly widows and orphans vulnerable to “property grabbing” by relatives. The Mission is considering proposals from its cross-sectoral Widows and Orphans Task Force to include judges of the high court and government prosecutors on inheritance law in the training, thereby complimenting PHN activities targeted at HIV/AIDS.

In sum, the Mission recognizes that cross-cutting activities capitalize on the comparative advantages of its SO’s and their teams. Examples include employing a privatization project agreement to support commercial arbitration when DG had the funds but lacked an obligating mechanism, and utilizing the technical expertise, experience, and professional networks within the Mission that benefit more than one SO, and better exploit limited human resources. The Mission wants to show by example “how not to stovepipe DG concerns” and how “democratic governance might be integrated, with less pain and fuss, into its plans, programs, and activities.” The Mission DG officer insists that if good governance were “relegated to an obscure office of the Ministry of Legal Affairs, we will have all failed in our efforts to promote and institutionalize democratic governance in Zambia.”

Field work on the case study was conducted during November 1998, by Dana Ott (AFR/SD/DG), Anne O’Toole Salinas (ABIC, R&RS Project), and David M. Miller (consultant).

## **Zimbabwe**

Zimbabwe maintains a vital, strategic economic and political importance to southern Africa’s regional stability that extends to the Great Lakes. However, in the 1990s, Zimbabwe has suffered from executive dominance of the political process, lack of political and economic accountability, and an economic crisis. HIV/AIDS threatens to undo decades of development.

Zimbabwe’s multi-sector crisis has spurred an outcry from civil society groups, which have organized themselves to promote constitutional reform. Their coalition, the National Constitutional Assembly, kept the issue of constitutional and political reform alive. Further, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), a broad-based coalition political party originating with the labor movement, figured prominently in the rejection of President Mugabe’s referendum on the Constitution in February 2000. The MDC made gains in the June 2000 national elections, depriving President Mugabe and the ZANU-PF party of a two-thirds majority in the parliament. USAID’s program in Zimbabwe aims to promote political and economic progress towards strengthening a democratic state with a liberal economy.

The Zimbabwe case illustrates purposeful DG-linking of activities within a proposed country strategic plan (CSP) and activities that are synergistic yet independent of the Mission’s democracy and governance strategic objective, such as the natural resource management activity, CAMPFIRE (Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources).

The CSP was approved in March 1999 and covers the period 2000-2005. It was designed to address the deterioration in the ongoing political and economic transition process. The Mission goal of “Supporting Zimbabweans’ access to greater and more equitable benefits from their nation’s social, political, and economic development” reflects the Mission philosophy that potential crises may be averted and the political and economic transition in Zimbabwe can get back on track.

Under the previous Country Strategic Plan (1997-2003), there were three strategic objectives and one special objective. SO1 read “Natural resources management strengthened for sustainable rural development for CAMPFIRE communities.” This SO provided a 10-year history of USAID involvement in an activity that incorporated DG principles and approaches in the design. SO2, “Broadened ownership

in a growing economy,” and SO3, “Reduced fertility and increased use of HIV/AIDS preventative measures” did not specifically target synergies with DG. The SpO, “Increased opportunities for participation in the private sector and political processes,” became the proposed DG SpO.

To support the new CSP, which calls for access “to greater and more equitable benefits from their nation’s social, political, and economic development,” the Mission has established two new strategic objectives and one special objective. The Citizens’ Participation SO reads “Enhanced citizen participation in economic and political decision-making”; the HIV/AIDS SO reads “HIV/AIDS crisis mitigated”; and the Economic Opportunity SpO reads “Access to economic opportunity for disadvantaged groups expanded. “

Field work for the case study was conducted in March and April 1999 by Don Muncy (AFR/SD/DG), Dana Ott (AFR/SD/DG), and Patrick Gonzales (AFR/SD/NRM).

## **Annex 3: Sample DG Cross-Sectoral Scope of Work<sup>7</sup>**

### **Scope of Work for Technical Assistance on Democracy and Governance and Cross-Sectoral Linkages USAID/Ethiopia**

#### **Overview**

The strategic objective for the AFR/SD/DG team emphasizes “Strengthened cross-sectoral synergies between democracy and governance and Africa Bureau programs in key areas.” As part of our efforts to achieve this objective, and in collaboration with the Global Center and CDIE, AFR/SD/DG has studied the linkages between democracy and governance and USAID’s other goal areas, i.e., economic growth, human capacity, population and health, and environmental sustainability in Africa.<sup>8, 9</sup>

Specifically, studies have focused on recent efforts undertaken by USAID operating units in the field and Washington to include program approaches from the Agency’s four democracy and governance objectives.<sup>10</sup> They involve development activities such as encouraging community natural resources management, promoting private enterprise, decentralizing health care, establishing community schools, continuing infrastructure development, and promoting irrigation and water utilization. The objective of the studies was to examine how, to what extent, and with what effect cross-sectorally linked democracy and government program approaches are being included in the other goal areas. These study findings and lessons learned can be applied to program design, implementation, and evaluation of cross-sectorally linked activities, programs, and strategic objectives.

AFR/SD’s Democracy and Governance Strategic Objective (SO) is based on the premise that programs that integrate principles of democratic local governance into other sectoral interventions (health, environment, education, etc.) achieve results in a more efficient, more sustainable manner and, at the same time, lay the foundation for democratic development.

Agency-approved documents such as the *New Partnerships Initiative Resource Guide* (1997), the *1996 USAID Performance Report*, and the Global Bureau’s *Democracy and Governance Center Strategic Plan 1997-2002* (1997), all clearly advocate for DG-based cross-sectoral linkages as a “developmental good” because they contribute to the achievement of the Agency’s sustainable development mission and results across all Agency goal areas.

In order to facilitate the achievement of USAID’s development goals across sectors, AFR/SD/DG (in collaboration with G/DG and PPC/CDIE) has conducted five studies on best practices being implemented in the field (Mali, Zambia, Guinea, Madagascar, and Zimbabwe). The information gleaned from these cases can be used to help missions replicate or adapt appropriate sector-specific models and assess their impact.

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<sup>7</sup> This scope of work was developed by Dr. Dana Ott for technical assistance to the Ethiopia Mission in designing their DG SO in December 1999.

<sup>8</sup> See the *U.S. Agency for International Development Strategic Plan*, September 1997.

<sup>9</sup> Humanitarian assistance has been excluded because its activities do not provide the variety of opportunities for cross-sectoral linkages with democracy and governance that the other sectors do.

<sup>10</sup> USAID Objective 2.1, strengthening rule of law and respect for human rights of women as well as men; USAID Objective 2.2, encouraging credible and competitive political processes; Objective 2.3, promoting the development of politically active civil society; and Objective 2.4, encouraging more transparent and accountable government institutions. For the 24 program approaches under these USAID objectives, see the September 1997 *USAID Strategic Plan*, Annex 1, Figure 4a.

## Purpose

USAID/Ethiopia is currently in the process of designing a new country strategy. AFR/SD/DG has found, through the case studies, that the optimum time for promoting synergistic programming is during the design phase of results frameworks and activities. Therefore, in order to maximize the potential for synergies across the USAID/Ethiopia portfolio, technical assistance will be provided to USAID/Ethiopia to examine the areas of potential synergy between the DG SO and each of the other sectors.

## TDY Design

### Overview

This temporary duty (TDY) will examine the relationship between democracy and governance and the other sectors of USAID/Ethiopia's portfolio, both in terms of existing activities, and proposed activities under the new CSP. Specifically this will involve:

- Examining ongoing activities that have integrated (or could potentially integrate) democracy and governance principles. In addition, incentives or obstacles to synergies at the SO or Mission level will be examined;
- Examining the DG SO (both the current SO and any proposed modifications) to determine where greater synergy with other sectors could be encouraged; and
- Consulting partner organizations in all sectors for their input to increase synergistic outcomes of mission programming.

### In-Country Fieldwork

The TDY team will spend approximately 14 days in-country. It is estimated that about three-quarters of the team's time will be spent at the Mission interviewing relevant staff and reviewing documents. The remaining time will be spent interviewing partner organizations and other relevant organizations and individuals where appropriate regarding the desirability of linking democracy and governance program approaches with those of other sectors (goal areas). Illustrative questions that will be utilized include:

1. In what ways can cross-sectorally linked programs involving democratic governance promote the achievement of results in other sectors in Ethiopia (i.e. by helping create a positive enabling environment—determining the role of government, rule of law, openness to citizen participation, freedom of assembly and the press, and/or capable public sector agencies)?<sup>11</sup> Can they increase the efficiency and effectiveness of sectoral reforms, (e.g., do they help mobilize underutilized resources, build accountability and responsiveness, create appropriate incentives, and increase participation)?
2. In what ways can cross-sectorally linked programs help achieve results in democratic governance?
  - Can they help build experience with democratic governance mechanisms and processes, e.g., by providing people and government with opportunities to learn and apply new principles and behaviors?
  - Can they help establish structures and mechanisms for democratic governance?
  - Can they provide leverage points for democratic governance, i.e., do they embrace policies and programs that support increased democratization?

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<sup>11</sup> Democratic governance is defined as effective management of public affairs, suffused with fundamental democratic principles, such as accountability, participation, and transparency.

3. Under what conditions are cross-sectoral programs involving democracy and governance most and least likely to help achieve results in other sectors (goal areas)? What are the important factors in deciding to make a program “cross-sectoral?”
4. In what ways do program operation factors (e.g., design, funding, personnel, procurement, and contracting,) constrain or promote the inclusion of democracy and governance activities in other sectors (and vice versa)? If the operating unit wants to promote a strategic objective or program approach in one or more sectors that are linked to a democracy and governance strategic objective or program approach:
  - How will staff be organized (e.g., teams) to implement activities pursuant to these objectives?
  - Will staff serve on multiple SO teams and, if so, what effect could this have on cross-sectoral programming?
  - Has there been consideration of personnel issues on cross-sectoral teams in terms of Annual Evaluation Forms, commitment, and availability? How does the operating unit foresee resolving such problems?
  - Is allocation of funds to different accounts a problem?
  - Can contracts serve more than one SO and, if so, how will this work (e.g., who is reported to and how is this done)?
5. In what ways do Agency policies and procedures (e.g., the Strategic Plan, Annual Performance Plan, performance measurement systems, and cross-cutting issues) constrain or promote linkages between democracy and governance and other sectors?
  - Will working across sectors make it more difficult to manage for results?
  - How will performance measurement requirements be handled in a cross-sectorally linked program?
6. In what ways could USAID/Washington and Mission management actions constrain or promote linkages between democracy and governance and other sectors?
  - What effects could earmarks, special initiatives, and other directives have on efforts to do cross-sectoral programs?
  - Does availability of technical staff (direct hire or personal services contractor) influence the likelihood of undertaking cross-sectoral activities?
  - What other management actions could affect the operating unit’s ability to and/or interest in doing cross-sectoral programs?
7. In what ways does the host country context—economic, social, and political factors—affect the feasibility of seeking cross-sectoral linkages and achieving favorable cross-sectoral outcomes?
8. In what ways can linkages between democracy and governance and other sectors be improved and/or increased?

## Reports

At the close of the trip, the team will draft a detailed trip report presenting the research results from the TDY to the DG Team, other sectoral staff, and mission management, as requested. In addition, the team will prepare a presentation for the mission highlighting findings and recommendations. Following the trip, the team will continue to assist the mission in the development of a more synergistic program.